Chrome's Antitrust Case

How Chrome Actually Won

Remember 2008? Internet Explorer dominated with over 90% market share. Firefox was the scrappy alternative. Safari existed. And the web was... slow. Buggy. Inconsistent.

Then Chrome launched and changed everything:

The DOJ's Argument

The DOJ argues Google maintained illegal monopolies through exclusive deals:

• Default search deals: Paying Apple, Samsung, and browser makers billions to make Google the default search engine.
• Android dominance: Requiring Google apps on Android devices.
• Chrome bundling: Promoting Chrome through Google's other properties.

These are legitimate antitrust concerns. Default positions matter enormously—most users never change defaults. And Google's payments to Apple ($15+ billion annually) do seem designed to eliminate competition.

But here's where DHH's contrarian view comes in: targeting Chrome specifically might cause more harm than good.

The Case for Chrome

1. The Open Web Needs Champions

Chrome is a massive investment in the open web platform. Google employs hundreds of engineers working on web standards, browser security, and platform improvements. Who else has the resources to do this at scale?

Without Chrome's investment, we might still have a fragmented, slow web with poor developer tools. Safari moves slowly. Firefox is resource-constrained. Edge uses Chromium anyway.

2. Chrome vs. Native Apps

The real competition isn't Chrome vs. Firefox—it's the web vs. native apps. Apple would love for the web to be worse because it drives people to the App Store. Chrome's improvements keep web apps competitive with native.

3. Breaking Up Chrome Doesn't Create Competition

If Chrome is split from Google, what happens? A standalone Chrome company still has 65% market share. Firefox still has limited resources. Safari still moves slowly. The separation doesn't create new competitors—it just changes ownership.

The Valid Concerns About Chrome

To be fair, Chrome dominance has real problems:

These are real concerns that deserve scrutiny. But the question is whether breaking up Chrome is the right remedy—or whether it's a sledgehammer that causes unintended consequences.

Better Remedies

If the goal is reducing Google's power while preserving the open web, there are more targeted approaches:

1. End Default Search Payments

The default search deals are the clearest antitrust issue. Ban them. Let users choose their search engine on first browser launch. This targets the monopoly maintenance directly.

2. Require Standards Neutrality

Prevent Chrome from implementing features that only work with Google services. Require open standards for any new capabilities. This preserves innovation while preventing lock-in.

3. Separate Advertising from Browser

The conflict of interest is Google making a browser while running an ad network. Separating the ad business from Chrome would reduce privacy concerns without destroying browser investment.

What This Means for Developers

Whatever happens with the DOJ case, the implications for web developers are significant:

• Test on multiple browsers: If Chrome's dominance decreases, cross-browser testing becomes more important again.
• Don't rely on Chrome-only features: Build for the web platform, not for Chrome specifically.
• Support browser diversity: Recommend Firefox, Safari, or Brave when appropriate. Competition is good.
• Watch web standards closely: Changes to how standards are developed could affect what features you can use.

The Nuanced Reality

DHH's take isn't "Google is good" or "antitrust is bad." It's more nuanced: Chrome specifically might be the wrong target, even if Google's overall dominance is problematic. The browser that made the web better shouldn't be punished for being successful through quality.

Antitrust regulators often think in terms of 20th-century markets—break up the monopoly, and competition flourishes. Tech markets are different. Breaking up Chrome might just benefit other monopolists (Apple, Facebook) at the expense of the open web.